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                      The TCP Authentication Option
 
 Abstract
 
    This document specifies the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO), which
    obsoletes the TCP MD5 Signature option of RFC 2385 (TCP MD5).  TCP-AO
    specifies the use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs),
    protects against replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and
    provides more details on the association of security with TCP
    connections than TCP MD5.  TCP-AO is compatible with either a static
    Master Key Tuple (MKT) configuration or an external, out-of-band MKT
    management mechanism; in either case, TCP-AO also protects
    connections when using the same MKT across repeated instances of a
    connection, using traffic keys derived from the MKT, and coordinates
    MKT changes between endpoints.  The result is intended to support
    current infrastructure uses of TCP MD5, such as to protect long-lived
    connections (as used, e.g., in BGP and LDP), and to support a larger
    set of MACs with minimal other system and operational changes.  TCP-
    AO uses a different option identifier than TCP MD5, even though TCP-
    AO and TCP MD5 are never permitted to be used simultaneously.  TCP-AO
    supports IPv6, and is fully compatible with the proposed requirements
    for the replacement of TCP MD5.
 
 Status of This Memo
 
    This is an Internet Standards Track document.
 
    This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
    (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
    received public review and has been approved for publication by the
    Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
    Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
 
    Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
    and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
    http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5925.
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 1.  Introduction
 
    The TCP MD5 Signature (TCP MD5) is a TCP option that authenticates
    TCP segments, including the TCP IPv4 pseudoheader, TCP header, and
    TCP data.  It was developed to protect BGP sessions from spoofed TCP
    segments, which could affect BGP data or the robustness of the TCP
    connection itself [RFC2385][RFC4953].
 
    There have been many recent concerns about TCP MD5.  Its use of a
    simple keyed hash for authentication is problematic because there
    have been escalating attacks on the algorithm itself [Wa05].  TCP MD5
    also lacks both key-management and algorithm agility.  This document
    adds the latter, and provides a simple key coordination mechanism
    giving the ability to move from one key to another within the same
    connection.  It does not however provide for complete cryptographic
    key management to be handled in band of TCP, because TCP SYN segments
    lack sufficient remaining space to handle such a negotiation (see
    Section 7.6).  This document obsoletes the TCP MD5 option with a more
    general TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO).  This new option supports
    the use of other, stronger hash functions, provides replay protection
    for long-lived connections and across repeated instances of a single
    connection, coordinates key changes between endpoints, and provides a
    more explicit recommendation for external key management.  The result
    is compatible with IPv6, and is fully compatible with proposed
    requirements for a replacement for TCP MD5 [Ed07].
 
    TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5, although a particular implementation may
    support both mechanisms for backward compatibility.  For a given
    connection, only one can be in use.  TCP MD5-protected connections
    cannot be migrated to TCP-AO because TCP MD5 does not support any
    changes to a connection’s security algorithm once established.
 
 1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document
 
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
    "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
    document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
 
    In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
    only when in ALL CAPS.  Lowercase uses of these words are not to be
    interpreted as carrying RFC 2119 significance.
 
    In this document, the characters ">>" preceeding an indented line(s)
    indicates a compliance requirement statement using the key words
    listed above.  This convention aids reviewers in quickly identifying
    or finding the explicit compliance requirements of this RFC.
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 1.2.  Applicability Statement
 
    TCP-AO is intended to support current uses of TCP MD5, such as to
    protect long-lived connections for routing protocols, such as BGP and
    LDP.  It is also intended to provide similar protection to any long-
    lived TCP connection, as might be used between proxy caches, for
    example, and is not designed solely or primarily for routing protocol
    uses.
 
    TCP-AO is intended to replace (and thus obsolete) the use of TCP MD5.
    TCP-AO enhances the capabilities of TCP MD5 as summarized in Section
    1.3.  This document recommends overall that:
 
    >> TCP implementations that support TCP MD5 MUST support TCP-AO.
 
    >> TCP-AO SHOULD be implemented where the protection afforded by TCP
    authentication is needed, because either IPsec is not supported or
    TCP-AO’s particular properties are needed (e.g., per-connection
    keys).
 
    >> TCP-AO MAY be implemented elsewhere.
 
    TCP-AO is not intended to replace the use of the IPsec suite (IPsec
    and Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)) to protect TCP connections
    [RFC4301][RFC4306].  Specific differences are noted in Section 1.3.
    In fact, we recommend the use of IPsec and IKE, especially where
    IKE’s level of existing support for parameter negotiation, session
    key negotiation, or rekeying are desired.  TCP-AO is intended for use
    only where the IPsec suite would not be feasible, e.g., as has been
    suggested is the case to support some routing protocols [RFC4953], or
    in cases where keys need to be tightly coordinated with individual
    transport sessions [Ed07].
 
    TCP-AO is not intended to replace the use of Transport Layer Security
    (TLS) [RFC5246], Secure BGP (sBGP) or Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)
    [Le09], or any other mechanisms that protect only the TCP data
    stream.  TCP-AO protects the transport layer, preventing attacks from
    disabling the TCP connection itself [RFC4953].  Data stream
    mechanisms protect only the contents of the TCP segments, and can be
    disrupted when the connection is affected.  Some of these data
    protection protocols -- notably TLS -- offer a richer set of key
    management and authentication mechanisms than TCP-AO, and thus
    protect the data stream in a different way.  TCP-AO may be used
    together with these data stream protections to complement each
    other’s strengths.
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 1.3.  Executive Summary
 
    This document replaces TCP MD5 as follows [RFC2385]:
 
    o  TCP-AO uses a separate option Kind (29).
 
    o  TCP-AO allows TCP MD5 to continue to be used concurrently for
       legacy connections.
 
    o  TCP-AO replaces TCP MD5’s single MAC algorithm with MACs specified
       in a separate document and can be extended to include other MACs.
 
    o  TCP-AO allows rekeying during a TCP connection, assuming that an
       out-of-band protocol or manual mechanism provides the new keys.
       The option includes a ’key ID’, which allows the efficient
       concurrent use of multiple keys, and a key coordination mechanism
       using a ’receive next key ID’ manages the key change within a
       connection.  Note that TCP MD5 does not preclude rekeying during a
       connection, but does not require its support either.  Further,
       TCP-AO supports key changes with zero segment loss, whereas key
       changes in TCP MD5 can lose segments in transit during the
       changeover or require trying multiple keys on each received
       segment during key use overlap because it lacks an explicit key
       ID.  Although TCP recovers lost segments through retransmission,
       loss can have a substantial impact on performance.
 
    o  TCP-AO provides automatic replay protection for long-lived
       connections using sequence number extensions.
 
    o  TCP-AO ensures per-connection traffic keys as unique as the TCP
       connection itself, using TCP’s Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) for
       differentiation, even when static master key tuples are used
       across repeated instances of connections on a single socket pair.
 
    o  TCP-AO specifies the details of how this option interacts with
       TCP’s states, event processing, and user interface.
 
    o  TCP-AO is 2 bytes shorter than TCP MD5 (16 bytes overall, rather
       than 18) in the initially specified default case (using a 96-bit
       MAC).
 
    TCP-AO differs from an IPsec/IKE solution as follows
    [RFC4301][RFC4306]:
 
    o  TCP-AO does not support dynamic parameter negotiation.
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    o  TCP-AO includes TCP’s socket pair (source address, destination
       address, source port, destination port) as a security parameter
       index (together with the KeyID), rather than using a separate
       field as an index (IPsec’s Security Parameter Index (SPI)).
 
    o  TCP-AO forces a change of computed MACs when a connection
       restarts, even when reusing a TCP socket pair (IP addresses and
       port numbers) [Ed07].
 
    o  TCP-AO does not support encryption.
 
    o  TCP-AO does not authenticate ICMP messages (some ICMP messages may
       be authenticated when using IPsec, depending on the
       configuration).
 
 2.  The TCP Authentication Option
 
    The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) uses a TCP option Kind value
    of 29.  The following sections describe TCP-AO and provide a review
    of TCP MD5 for comparison.
 
 2.1.  Review of TCP MD5 Option
 
    For review, the TCP MD5 option is shown in Figure 1.
 
                +---------+---------+-------------------+
                | Kind=19 |Length=18|   MD5 digest...   |
                +---------+---------+-------------------+
                |          ...digest (con’t)...         |
                +---------------------------------------+
                |                  ...                  |
                +---------------------------------------+
                |                  ...                  |
                +-------------------+-------------------+
                | ...digest (con’t) |
                +-------------------+
 
                   Figure 1: The TCP MD5 Option [RFC2385]
 
    In the TCP MD5 option, the length is fixed, and the MD5 digest
    occupies 16 bytes following the Kind and Length fields (each one
    byte), using the full MD5 digest of 128 bits [RFC1321].
 
    The TCP MD5 option specifies the use of the MD5 digest calculation
    over the following values in the following order:
 
    1. The IP pseudoheader (IP source and destination addresses, protocol
       number, and segment length).
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    2. The TCP header excluding options and checksum.
 
    3. The TCP data payload.
 
    4. A key.
 
 2.2.  The TCP Authentication Option Format
 
    TCP-AO provides a superset of the capabilities of TCP MD5, and is
    minimal in the spirit of SP4 [SDNS88].  TCP-AO uses a new Kind field,
    and similar Length field to TCP MD5, a KeyID field, and a RNextKeyID
    field as shown in Figure 2.
 
             +------------+------------+------------+------------+
             |  Kind=29   |   Length   |   KeyID    | RNextKeyID |
             +------------+------------+------------+------------+
             |                     MAC           ...
             +-----------------------------------...
 
                ...-----------------+
                ...  MAC (con’t)    |
                ...-----------------+
 
              Figure 2: The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)
 
    TCP-AO defines these fields as follows:
 
    o  Kind: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating TCP-AO.  TCP-AO uses a
       new Kind value of 29.
 
       >> An endpoint MUST NOT use TCP-AO for the same connection in
       which TCP MD5 is used.  When both options appear, TCP MUST
       silently discard the segment.
 
       >> A single TCP segment MUST NOT have more than one TCP-AO in its
       options sequence.  When multiple TCP-AOs appear, TCP MUST discard
       the segment.
 
    o  Length: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating the length of the
       option in bytes, including the Kind, Length, KeyID, RNextKeyID,
       and MAC fields.
 
       >> The Length value MUST be greater than or equal to 4.  When the
       Length value is less than 4, TCP MUST discard the segment.
 
       >> The Length value MUST be consistent with the TCP header length.
       When the Length value is invalid, TCP MUST discard the segment.
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       This Length check implies that the sum of the sizes of all
       options, when added to the size of the base TCP header (5 words),
       matches the TCP Offset field exactly.  This full verification can
       be computed because RFC 793 specifies the size of the required
       options, and RFC 1122 requires that all new options follow a
       common format with a fixed-length field location
       [RFC793][RFC1122].  A partial verification can be limited to check
       only TCP-AO, so that the TCP-AO length, when added to the TCP-AO
       offset from the start of the TCP header, does not exceed the TCP
       header size as indicated in the TCP header Offset field.
 
       Values of 4 and other small values larger than 4 (e.g., indicating
       MAC fields of very short length) are of dubious utility but are
       not specifically prohibited.
 
    o  KeyID: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating the Master Key Tuple
       (MKT, as defined in Section 3.1) used to generate the traffic keys
       that were used to generate the MAC that authenticates this
       segment.
 
       It supports efficient key changes during a connection and/or to
       help with key coordination during connection establishment, to be
       discussed further in Section 6.1.  Note that the KeyID has no
       cryptographic properties -- it need not be random, nor are there
       any reserved values.
 
       >> KeyID values MAY be the same in both directions of a
       connection, but do not have to be and there is no special meaning
       when they are.
 
       This allows MKTs to be installed on a set of devices without
       coordinating the KeyIDs across that entire set in advance, and
       allows new devices to be added to that set using a group of MKTs
       later without requiring renumbering of KeyIDs.  These two
       capabilities are particularly important when used with wildcards
       in the TCP socket pair of the MKT, i.e., when an MKT is used among
       a set of devices specified by a pattern (as noted in Section 3.1).
 
    o  RNextKeyID: An unsigned 1-byte field indicating the MKT that is
       ready at the sender to be used to authenticate received segments,
       i.e., the desired ’receive next’ key ID.
 
       It supports efficient key change coordination, to be discussed
       further in Section 6.1.  Note that the RNextKeyID has no
       cryptographic properties -- it need not be random, nor are there
       any reserved values.
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    o  MAC: Message Authentication Code.  Its contents are determined by
       the particulars of the security association.  Typical MACs are
       96-128 bits (12-16 bytes), but any length that fits in the header
       of the segment being authenticated is allowed.  The MAC
       computation is described further in Section 5.1.
 
       >> Required support for TCP-AO MACs is defined in [RFC5926]; other
       MACs MAY be supported.
 
    TCP-AO fields do not indicate the MAC algorithm either implicitly (as
    with TCP MD5) or explicitly.  The particular algorithm used is
    considered part of the configuration state of the connection’s
    security and is managed separately (see Section 3).
 
    Please note that the use of TCP-AO does not affect TCP’s advertised
    Maximum Segment Size (MSS), as is the case for all TCP options
    [Bo09].
 
    The remainder of this document explains how TCP-AO is handled and its
    relationship to TCP.
 
 3.  TCP-AO Keys and Their Properties
 
    TCP-AO relies on two sets of keys to authenticate incoming and
    outgoing segments: Master Key Tuples (MKTs) and traffic keys.  MKTs
    are used to derive unique traffic keys, and include the keying
    material used to generate those traffic keys, as well as indicating
    the associated parameters under which traffic keys are used.  Such
    parameters include whether TCP options are authenticated, and
    indicators of the algorithms used for traffic key derivation and MAC
    calculation.  Traffic keys are the keying material used to compute
    the MAC of individual TCP segments.
 
 3.1.  Master Key Tuple
 
    A Master Key Tuple (MKT) describes TCP-AO properties to be associated
    with one or more connections.  It is composed of the following:
 
    o  TCP connection identifier.  A TCP socket pair, i.e., a local IP
       address, a remote IP address, a TCP local port, and a TCP remote
       port.  Values can be partially specified using ranges (e.g.,
       2-30), masks (e.g., 0xF0), wildcards (e.g., "*"), or any other
       suitable indication.
 
    o  TCP option flag.  This flag indicates whether TCP options other
       than TCP-AO are included in the MAC calculation.  When options are
       included, the content of all options, in the order present, is
       included in the MAC, with TCP-AO’s MAC field zeroed out.  When the
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       options are not included, all options other than TCP-AO are
       excluded from all MAC calculations (skipped over, not zeroed).
       Note that TCP-AO, with its MAC field zeroed out, is always
       included in the MAC calculation, regardless of the setting of this
       flag; this protects the indication of the MAC length as well as
       the key ID fields (KeyID, RNextKeyID).  The option flag applies to
       TCP options in both directions (incoming and outgoing segments).
 
    o  IDs.  The values used in the KeyID or RNextKeyID of TCP-AO; used
       to differentiate MKTs in concurrent use (KeyID), as well as to
       indicate when MKTs are ready for use in the opposite direction
       (RNextKeyID).
 
       Each MKT has two IDs - -- a SendID and a RecvID.  The SendID is
       inserted as the KeyID of the TCP-AO option of outgoing segments,
       and the RecvID is matched against the TCP-AO KeyID of incoming
       segments.  These and other uses of these two IDs are described
       further in Sections 7.4 and 7.5.
 
       >> MKT IDs MUST support any value, 0-255 inclusive.  There are no
       reserved ID values.
 
       ID values are assigned arbitrarily, i.e., the values are not
       monotonically increasing, have no reserved values, and are
       otherwise not meaningful.  They can be assigned in sequence, or
       based on any method mutually agreed by the connection endpoints
       (e.g., using an external MKT management mechanism).
 
       >> IDs MUST NOT be assumed to be randomly assigned.
 
    o  Master key.  A byte sequence used for generating traffic keys,
       this may be derived from a separate shared key by an external
       protocol over a separate channel.  This sequence is used in the
       traffic key generation algorithm described in Section 5.2.
 
       Implementations are advised to keep master key values in a
       private, protected area of memory or other storage.
 
    o  Key Derivation Function (KDF).  Indicates the key derivation
       function and its parameters, as used to generate traffic keys from
       master keys.  It is explained further in Section 5.2 of this
       document and specified in detail in [RFC5926].
 
    o  Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm.  Indicates the MAC
       algorithm and its parameters as used for this connection.  It is
       explained further in Section 5.1 of this document and specified in
       detail in [RFC5926].
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    >> Components of an MKT MUST NOT change during a connection.
 
    MKT component values cannot change during a connection because TCP
    state is coordinated during connection establishment.  TCP lacks a
    handshake for modifying that state after a connection has been
    established.
 
    >> The set of MKTs MAY change during a connection.
 
    MKT parameters are not changed.  Instead, new MKTs can be installed,
    and a connection can change which MKT it uses.
 
    >> The IDs of MKTs MUST NOT overlap where their TCP connection
    identifiers overlap.
 
    This document does not address how MKTs are created by users or
    processes.  It is presumed that an MKT affecting a particular
    connection cannot be destroyed during an active connection -- or,
    equivalently, that its parameters are copied to an area local to the
    connection (i.e., instantiated) and so changes would affect only new
    connections.  The MKTs can be managed by a separate application
    protocol.
 
 3.2.  Traffic Keys
 
    A traffic key is a key derived from the MKT and the local and remote
    IP address pairs and TCP port numbers, and, for established
    connections, the TCP Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) in each
    direction.  Segments exchanged before a connection is established use
    the same information, substituting zero for unknown values (e.g.,
    ISNs not yet coordinated).
 
    A single MKT can be used to derive any of four different traffic
    keys:
 
    o  Send_SYN_traffic_key
 
    o  Receive_SYN_traffic_key
 
    o  Send_other_traffic_key
 
    o  Receive_other_traffic_key
 
    Note that the keys are unidirectional.  A given connection typically
    uses only three of these keys, because only one of the SYN keys is
    typically used.  All four are used only when a connection goes
    through ’simultaneous open’ [RFC793].
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    The relationship between MKTs and traffic keys is shown in Figure 3.
    Traffic keys are indicated with a "*".  Note that every MKT can be
    used to derive any of the four traffic keys, but only the keys
    actually needed to handle the segments of a connection need to be
    computed.  Section 5.2 provides further details on how traffic keys
    are derived.
 
                      MKT-A                            MKT-B
             +---------------------+        +------------------------+
             | SendID = 1          |        | SendID = 5             |
             | RecvID = 2          |        | RecvID = 6             |
             | MAC = HMAC-SHA1     |        | MAC = AES-CMAC         |
             | KDF = KDF-HMAC-SHA1 |        | KDF = KDF-AES-128-CMAC |
             +---------------------+        +------------------------+
                        |                                |
             +----------+----------+                     |
             |                     |                     |
             v                     v                     v
        Connection 1          Connection 2          Connection 3
    +------------------+  +------------------+  +------------------+
    | * Send_SYN_key   |  | * Send_SYN_key   |  | * Send_SYN_key   |
    | * Recv_SYN_key   |  | * Recv_SYN_key   |  | * Recv_SYN_key   |
    | * Send_Other_key |  | * Send_Other_key |  | * Send_Other_key |
    | * Recv_Other_key |  | * Recv_Other_key |  | * Recv_Other_key |
    +------------------+  +------------------+  +------------------+
 
            Figure 3: Relationship between MKTs and Traffic Keys
 
 3.3.  MKT Properties
 
    TCP-AO requires that every protected TCP segment match exactly one
    MKT.  When an outgoing segment matches an MKT, TCP-AO is used.  When
    no match occurs, TCP-AO is not used.  Multiple MKTs may match a
    single outgoing segment, e.g., when MKTs are being changed.  Those
    MKTs cannot have conflicting IDs (as noted elsewhere), and some
    mechanism must determine which MKT to use for each given outgoing
    segment.
 
    >> An outgoing TCP segment MUST match at most one desired MKT,
    indicated by the segment’s socket pair.  The segment MAY match
    multiple MKTs, provided that exactly one MKT is indicated as desired.
    Other information in the segment MAY be used to determine the desired
    MKT when multiple MKTs match; such information MUST NOT include
    values in any TCP option fields.
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    We recommend that the mechanism used to select from among multiple
    MKTs use only information that TCP-AO would authenticate.  Because
    MKTs may indicate that options other than TCP-AO are ignored in the
    MAC calculation, we recommend that TCP options should not be used to
    determine MKTs.
 
    >> An incoming TCP segment including TCP-AO MUST match exactly one
    MKT, indicated solely by the segment’s socket pair and its TCP-AO
    KeyID.
 
    Incoming segments include an indicator inside TCP-AO to select from
    among multiple matching MKTs -- the KeyID field.  TCP-AO requires
    that the KeyID alone be used to differentiate multiple matching MKTs,
    so that MKT changes can be coordinated using the TCP-AO key change
    coordination mechanism.
 
    >> When an outgoing TCP segment matches no MKTs, TCP-AO is not used.
 
    TCP-AO is always used when outgoing segments match an MKT, and is not
    used otherwise.
 
 4.  Per-Connection TCP-AO Parameters
 
    TCP-AO uses a small number of parameters associated with each
    connection that uses TCP-AO, once instantiated.  These values can be
    stored in the Transport Control Block (TCB) [RFC793].  These values
    are explained in subsequent sections of this document as noted; they
    include:
 
    1. Current_key - the MKT currently used to authenticate outgoing
       segments, whose SendID is inserted in outgoing segments as KeyID
       (see Section 7.4, step 2.f).  Incoming segments are authenticated
       using the MKT corresponding to the segment and its TCP-AO KeyID
       (see Section 7.5, step 2.c), as matched against the MKT TCP
       connection identifier and the MKT RecvID.  There is only one
       current_key at any given time on a particular connection.
 
       >> Every TCP connection in a non-IDLE state MUST have at most one
       current_key specified.
 
    2. Rnext_key - the MKT currently preferred for incoming (received)
       segments, whose RecvID is inserted in outgoing segments as
       RNextKeyID (see Section 7.4, step 2.d).
 
       >> Each TCP connection in a non-IDLE state MUST have at most one
       rnext_key specified.
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    3. A pair of Sequence Number Extensions (SNEs).  SNEs are used to
       prevent replay attacks, as described in Section 6.2.  Each SNE is
       initialized to zero upon connection establishment.  Its use in the
       MAC calculation is described in Section 5.1.
 
    4. One or more MKTs.  These are the MKTs that match this connection’s
       socket pair.
 
    MKTs are used, together with other parameters of a connection, to
    create traffic keys unique to each connection, as described in
    Section 5.2.  These traffic keys can be cached after computation, and
    can be stored in the TCB with the corresponding MKT information.
    They can be considered part of the per-connection parameters.
 
 5.  Cryptographic Algorithms
 
    TCP-AO uses cryptographic algorithms to compute the MAC (Message
    Authentication Code) that is used to authenticate a segment and its
    headers; these are called MAC algorithms and are specified in a
    separate document to facilitate updating the algorithm requirements
    independently from the protocol [RFC5926].  TCP-AO also uses
    cryptographic algorithms to convert MKTs, which can be shared across
    connections, into unique traffic keys for each connection.  These are
    called Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) and are specified [RFC5926].
    This section describes how these algorithms are used by TCP-AO.
 
 5.1.  MAC Algorithms
 
    MAC algorithms take a variable-length input and a key and output a
    fixed-length number.  This number is used to determine whether the
    input comes from a source with that same key, and whether the input
    has been tampered with in transit.  MACs for TCP-AO have the
    following interface:
 
       MAC = MAC_alg(traffic_key, message)
 
       INPUT: MAC_alg, traffic_key, message
 
       OUTPUT: MAC
 
    where:
 
    o  MAC_alg - the specific MAC algorithm used for this computation.
       The MAC algorithm specifies the output length, so no separate
       output length parameter is required.  This is specified as
       described in [RFC5926].
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    o  Traffic_key - traffic key used for this computation.  This is
       computed from the connection’s current MKT as described in Section
       5.2.
 
    o  Message - input data over which the MAC is computed.  In TCP-AO,
       this is the TCP segment prepended by the IP pseudoheader and TCP
       header options, as described in Section 5.1.
 
    o  MAC - the fixed-length output of the MAC algorithm, given the
       parameters provided.
 
    At the time of this writing, the algorithms’ definitions for use in
    TCP-AO, as described in [RFC5926], are each truncated to 96 bits.
    Though the algorithms each output a larger MAC, 96 bits provides a
    reasonable trade-off between security and message size.  However,
    this could change in the future, so TCP-AO size should not be assumed
    as fixed length.
 
    The MAC algorithm employed for the MAC computation on a connection is
    done so by definition in the MKT, per the definition in [RFC5926].
 
    The mandatory-to-implement MAC algorithms for use with TCP-AO are
    described in a separate RFC [RFC5926].  This allows the TCP-AO
    specification to proceed along the IETF Standards Track even if
    changes are needed to its associated algorithms and their labels (as
    might be used in a user interface or automated MKT management
    protocol) as a result of the ever evolving world of cryptography.
 
    >> Additional algorithms, beyond those mandated for TCP-AO, MAY be
    supported.
 
    The data input to the MAC is in the following fields in the following
    sequence, interpreted in network-standard byte order:
 
    1. The Sequence Number Extension (SNE), in network-standard byte
       order, as follows (described further in Section 6.2):
 
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                   |                SNE                |
                   +--------+--------+--------+--------+
 
                     Figure 4: Sequence Number Extension
 
       The SNE for transmitted segments is maintained locally in the
       SND.SNE value; for received segments, a local RCV.SNE value is
       used.  The details of how these values are maintained and used are
       in Sections 6.2, 7.4, and 7.5.
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    2. The IP pseudoheader: IP source and destination addresses, protocol
       number, and segment length, all in network byte order, prepended
       to the TCP header below.  The IP pseudoheader is exactly as used
       for the TCP checksum in either IPv4 or IPv6 [RFC793][RFC2460]:
 
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |           Source Address          |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |         Destination Address       |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |  Zero  | Proto  |    TCP Length   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
 
                  Figure 5: TCP IPv4 Pseudoheader [RFC793]
 
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +           Source Address          +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +         Destination Address       +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |     Upper-Layer Payload Length    |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |      Zero       |   Next Header   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
 
                  Figure 6: TCP IPv6 Pseudoheader [RFC2460]
 
    3. The TCP header, by default including options, and where the TCP
       checksum and TCP-AO MAC fields are set to zero, all in network-
       byte order.
 
       The TCP option flag of the MKT indicates whether the TCP options
       are included in the MAC.  When included, only the TCP-AO MAC field
       is zeroed.
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       When TCP options are not included, all TCP options except for TCP-
       AO are omitted from MAC processing.  Again, the TCP-AO MAC field
       is zeroed for the MAC processing.
 
    4. The TCP data, i.e., the payload of the TCP segment.
 
       Note that the traffic key is not included as part of the data; the
       MAC algorithm indicates how to use the traffic key, for example,
       as HMACs do [RFC2104][RFC2403].  The traffic key is derived from
       the current MKT as described in Section 5.2.
 
 5.2.  Traffic Key Derivation Functions
 
    TCP-AO’s traffic keys are derived from the MKTs using Key Derivation
    Functions (KDFs).  The KDFs used in TCP-AO have the following
    interface:
 
       traffic_key = KDF_alg(master_key, context, output_length)
 
       INPUT: KDF_alg, master_key, context, output_length
 
       OUTPUT: traffic_key
 
    where:
 
    o  KDF_alg - The specific Key Derivation Function (KDF) that is the
       basic building block used in constructing the traffic key, as
       indicated in the MKT.  This is specified as described in
       [RFC5926].
 
    o  Master_key - The master_key string, as will be stored into the
       associated MKT.
 
    o  Context - The context used as input in constructing the
       traffic_key, as specified in [RFC5926].  The specific way this
       context is used, in conjunction with other information, to create
       the raw input to the KDF is also explained further in [RFC5926].
 
    o  Output_length - The desired output length of the KDF, i.e., the
       length to which the KDF’s output will be truncated.  This is
       specified as described in [RFC5926].
 
    o  Traffic_key - The desired output of the KDF, of length
       output_length, to be used as input to the MAC algorithm, as
       described in Section 5.1.
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    The context used as input to the KDF combines the TCP socket pair
    with the endpoint Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs) of a connection.
    This data is unique to each TCP connection instance, which enables
    TCP-AO to generate unique traffic keys for that connection, even from
    an MKT used across many different connections or across repeated
    connections that share a socket pair.  Unique traffic keys are
    generated without relying on external key management properties.  The
    KDF context is defined in Figures 7 and 8.
 
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |           Source Address          |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |         Destination Address       |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |   Source Port   |    Dest. Port   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |            Source ISN             |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |             Dest. ISN             |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
 
                Figure 7: KDF Context for an IPv4 Connection
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                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +           Source Address          +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +         Destination Address       +
                |                                   |
                +                                   +
                |                                   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |   Source Port   |    Dest. Port   |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |            Source ISN             |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
                |             Dest. ISN             |
                +--------+--------+--------+--------+
 
                Figure 8: KDF Context for an IPv6 Connection
 
    Traffic keys are directional, so "source" and "destination" are
    interpreted differently for incoming and outgoing segments.  For
    incoming segments, source is the remote side; whereas for outgoing
    segments, source is the local side.  This further ensures that
    connection keys generated for each direction are unique.
 
    For SYN segments (segments with the SYN set, but the ACK not set),
    the destination ISN is not known.  For these segments, the connection
    key is computed using the context shown above, in which the
    destination ISN value is zero.  For all other segments, the ISN pair
    is used when known.  If the ISN pair is not known, e.g., when sending
    a reset (RST) after a reboot, the segment should be sent without
    authentication; if authentication was required, the segment cannot
    have been MAC’d properly anyway and would have been dropped on
    receipt.
 
    >> TCP-AO SYN segments (SYN set, no ACK set) MUST use a destination
    ISN of zero (whether sent or received); all other segments use the
    known ISN pair.
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    Overall, this means that each connection will use up to four distinct
    traffic keys for each MKT:
 
    o  Send_SYN_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
       outgoing SYNs.  The source ISN is known (the TCP connection’s
       local ISN), and the destination (remote) ISN is unknown (and so
       the value 0 is used).
 
    o  Receive_SYN_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
       incoming SYNs.  The source ISN is known (the TCP connection’s
       remote ISN), and the destination (remote) ISN is unknown (and so
       the value 0 is used).
 
    o  Send_other_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate all
       other outgoing TCP segments.
 
    o  Receive_other_traffic_key - the traffic key used to authenticate
       all other incoming TCP segments.
 
    The following table describes how each of these traffic keys is
    computed, where the TCP-AO algorithms refer to source (S) and
    destination (D) values of the IP address, TCP port, and ISN, and each
    segment (incoming or outgoing) has a value that refers to the local
    side of the connection (l) and remote side (r):
 
                                S-IP S-port S-ISN D-IP D-port D-ISN
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
     Send_SYN_traffic_key       l-IP l-port l-ISN r-IP r-port 0
     Receive_SYN_traffic_key    r-IP r-port r-ISN l-IP l-port 0
     Send_other_traffic_key     l-IP l-port l-ISN r-IP r-port r-ISN
     Receive_other_traffic_key  r-IP r-port r-ISN l-IP l-port l-ISN
 
    The use of both ISNs in the traffic key computations ensures that
    segments cannot be replayed across repeated connections reusing the
    same socket; their 32-bit space avoids repeated use except under
    reboot, and reuse assumes both sides repeat their use on the same
    connection.  We do expect that:
 
    >> Endpoints should select ISNs pseudorandomly, e.g., as in
    [RFC1948].
 
    A SYN is authenticated using a destination ISN of zero (whether sent
    or received), and all other segments would be authenticated using the
    ISN pair for the connection.  There are other cases in which the
    destination ISN is not known, but segments are emitted, such as after
    an endpoint reboots, when it is possible that the two endpoints would
    not have enough information to authenticate segments.  This is
    addressed further in Section 7.7.
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 5.3.  Traffic Key Establishment and Duration Issues
 
    TCP-AO does not provide a mechanism for traffic key negotiation or
    parameter negotiation (MAC algorithm, length, or use of TCP-AO on a
    connection), or for coordinating rekeying during a connection.  We
    assume out-of-band mechanisms for MKT establishment, parameter
    negotiation, and rekeying.  This separation of MKT use from MKT
    management is similar to that in the IPsec suite [RFC4301][RFC4306].
 
    We encourage users of TCP-AO to apply known techniques for generating
    appropriate MKTs, including the use of reasonable master key lengths,
    limited traffic key sharing, and limiting the duration of MKT use
    [RFC3562].  This also includes the use of per-connection nonces, as
    suggested in Section 5.2.
 
    TCP-AO supports rekeying in which new MKTs are negotiated and
    coordinated out of band, either via a protocol or a manual procedure
    [RFC4808].  New MKT use is coordinated using the out-of-band
    mechanism to update both TCP endpoints.  When only a single MKT is
    used at a time, the temporary use of invalid MKTs could result in
    segments being dropped; although TCP is already robust to such drops,
    TCP-AO uses the KeyID field to avoid such drops.  A given connection
    can have multiple matching MKTs, where the KeyID field is used to
    identify the MKT that corresponds to the traffic key used for a
    segment, to avoid the need for expensive trial-and-error testing of
    MKTs in sequence.
 
    TCP-AO provides an explicit MKT coordination mechanism, described in
    Section 6.1.  Such a mechanism is useful when new MKTs are installed,
    or when MKTs are changed, to determine when to commence using
    installed MKTs.
 
    Users are advised to manage MKTs following the spirit of the advice
    for key management when using TCP MD5 [RFC3562], notably to use
    appropriate key lengths (12-24 bytes) and to avoid sharing MKTs among
    multiple BGP peering arrangements.
 
 5.3.1.  MKT Reuse Across Socket Pairs
 
    MKTs can be reused across different socket pairs within a host, or
    across different instances of a socket pair within a host.  In either
    case, replay protection is maintained.
 
    MKTs reused across different socket pairs cannot enable replay
    attacks because the TCP socket pair is included in the MAC, as well
    as in the generation of the traffic key.  MKTs reused across repeated
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    instances of a given socket pair cannot enable replay attacks because
    the connection ISNs are included in the traffic key generation
    algorithm, and ISN pairs are unlikely to repeat over useful periods.
 
 5.3.2.  MKTs Use within a Long-Lived Connection
 
    TCP-AO uses Sequence Number Extensions (SNEs) to prevent replay
    attacks within long-lived connections.  Explicit MKT rollover,
    accomplished by external means and indexed using the KeyID field, can
    be used to change keying material for various reasons (e.g.,
    personnel turnover), but is not required to support long-lived
    connections.
 
 6.  Additional Security Mechanisms
 
    TCP-AO adds mechanisms to support efficient use, especially in
    environments where only manual keying is available.  These include
    the previously described mechanisms for supporting multiple
    concurrent MKTs (via the KeyID field) and for generating unique per-
    connection traffic keys (via the KDF).  This section describes
    additional mechanisms to coordinate MKT changes and to prevent replay
    attacks when a traffic key is not changed for long periods of time.
 
 6.1.  Coordinating Use of New MKTs
 
    At any given time, a single TCP connection may have multiple MKTs
    specified for each segment direction (incoming, outgoing).  TCP-AO
    provides a mechanism to indicate when a new MKT is ready, which
    allows the sender to commence use of that new MKT.  This mechanism
    allows new MKT use to be coordinated, to avoid unnecessary loss due
    to sender authentication using an MKT not yet ready at the receiver.
 
    Note that this is intended as an optimization.  Deciding when to
    start using a key is a performance issue.  Deciding when to remove an
    MKT is a security issue.  Invalid MKTs are expected to be removed.
    TCP-AO provides no mechanism to coordinate their removal, as we
    consider this a key management operation.
 
    New MKT use is coordinated through two ID fields in the header:
 
    o  KeyID
 
    o  RNextKeyID
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    KeyID represents the outgoing MKT information used by the segment
    sender to create the segment’s MAC (outgoing), and the corresponding
    incoming keying information used by the segment receiver to validate
    that MAC.  It contains the SendID of the MKT in active use in that
    direction.
 
    RNextKeyID represents the preferred MKT information to be used for
    subsequent received segments (’receive next’).  That is, it is a way
    for the segment sender to indicate a ready incoming MKT for future
    segments it receives, so that the segment receiver can know when to
    switch MKTs (and thus their KeyIDs and associated traffic keys).  It
    indicates the RecvID of the MKT desired for incoming segments.
 
    There are two pointers kept by each side of a connection, as noted in
    the per-connection information (see Section 4):
 
    o  Currently active outgoing MKT (current_key)
 
    o  Current preference for incoming MKT (rnext_key)
 
    Current_key indicates an MKT that is used to authenticate outgoing
    segments.  Upon connection establishment, it points to the first MKT
    selected for use.
 
    Rnext_key points to an incoming MKT that is ready and preferred for
    use.  Upon connection establishment, this points to the currently
    active incoming MKT.  It can be changed when new MKTs are installed
    (e.g., by either automatic MKT management protocol operation or user
    manual selection).
 
    Rnext_key is changed only by manual user intervention or MKT
    management protocol operation.  It is not manipulated by TCP-AO.
    Current_key is updated by TCP-AO when processing received TCP
    segments as discussed in the segment processing description in
    Section 7.5.  Note that the algorithm allows the current_key to
    change to a new MKT, then change back to a previously used MKT (known
    as "backing up").  This can occur during an MKT change when segments
    are received out of order, and is considered a feature of TCP-AO,
    because reordering does not result in drops.  The only way to avoid
    reuse of previously used MKTs is to remove the MKT when it is no
    longer considered permitted.
 
 6.2.  Preventing Replay Attacks within Long-Lived Connections
 
    TCP uses a 32-bit sequence number, which may, for long-lived
    connections, roll over and repeat.  This could result in TCP segments
    being intentionally and legitimately replayed within a connection.
    TCP-AO prevents replay attacks, and thus requires a way to
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    differentiate these legitimate replays from each other, and so it
    adds a 32-bit Sequence Number Extension (SNE) for transmitted and
    received segments.
 
    The SNE extends the TCP sequence number so that segments within a
    single connection are always unique.  When the TCP’s sequence number
    rolls over, there is a chance that a segment could be repeated in
    total; using an SNE differentiates even identical segments sent with
    identical sequence numbers at different times in a connection.  TCP-
    AO emulates a 64-bit sequence number space by inferring when to
    increment the high-order 32-bit portion (the SNE) based on
    transitions in the low-order portion (the TCP sequence number).
 
    TCP-AO thus maintains SND.SNE for transmitted segments, and RCV.SNE
    for received segments, both initialized as zero when a connection
    begins.  The intent of these SNEs is, together with TCP’s 32-bit
    sequence numbers, to provide a 64-bit overall sequence number space.
 
    For transmitted segments, SND.SNE can be implemented by extending
    TCP’s sequence number to 64 bits; SND.SNE would be the top (high-
    order) 32 bits of that number.  For received segments, TCP-AO needs
    to emulate the use of a 64-bit number space and correctly infer the
    appropriate high-order 32-bits of that number as RCV.SNE from the
    received 32-bit sequence number and the current connection context.
 
    The implementation of SNEs is not specified in this document, but one
    possible way is described here that can be used for either RCV.SNE,
    SND.SNE, or both.
 
    Consider an implementation with two SNEs as required (SND.SNE, RCV.
    SNE), and additional variables as listed below, all initialized to
    zero, as well as a current TCP segment field (SEG.SEQ):
 
    o  SND.PREV_SEQ, needed to detect rollover of SND.SEQ
 
    o  RCV.PREV_SEQ, needed to detect rollover of RCV.SEQ
 
    o  SND.SNE_FLAG, which indicates when to increment the SND.SNE
 
    o  RCV.SNE_FLAG, which indicates when to increment the RCV.SNE
 
    When a segment is received, the following algorithm (in C-like
    pseudocode) computes the SNE used in the MAC; this is the "RCV" side,
    and an equivalent algorithm can be applied to the "SND" side:
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       /* set the flag when the SEG.SEQ first rolls over */
       if ((RCV.SNE_FLAG == 0)
          && (RCV.PREV_SEQ > 0x7fff) && (SEG.SEQ < 0x7fff)) {
             RCV.SNE = RCV.SNE + 1;
             RCV.SNE_FLAG = 1;
       }
       /* decide which SNE to use after incremented */
       if ((RCV.SNE_FLAG == 1) && (SEG.SEQ > 0x7fff)) {
          SNE = RCV.SNE - 1; # use the pre-increment value
       } else {
          SNE = RCV.SNE; # use the current value
       }
       /* reset the flag in the *middle* of the window */
       if ((RCV.PREV_SEQ < 0x7fff) && (SEG.SEQ > 0x7fff)) {
          RCV.SNE_FLAG = 0;
       }
       /* save the current SEQ for the next time through the code */
       RCV.PREV_SEQ = SEG.SEQ;
 
    In the above code, the first time the sequence number rolls over,
    i.e., when the new number is low (in the bottom half of the number
    space) and the old number is high (in the top half of the number
    space), the SNE is incremented and a flag is set.
 
    If the flag is set and a high number is seen, it must be a reordered
    segment, so use the pre-increment SNE; otherwise, use the current
    SNE.
 
    The flag will be cleared by the time the number rolls all the way
    around.
 
    The flag prevents the SNE from being incremented again until the flag
    is reset, which happens in the middle of the window (when the old
    number is in the bottom half and the new is in the top half).
    Because the receive window is never larger than half of the number
    space, it is impossible to both set and reset the flag at the same
    time -- outstanding segments, regardless of reordering, cannot
    straddle both regions simultaneously.
 
 7.  TCP-AO Interaction with TCP
 
    The following is a description of how TCP-AO affects various TCP
    states, segments, events, and interfaces.  This description is
    intended to augment the description of TCP as provided in RFC 793,
    and its presentation mirrors that of RFC 793 as a result [RFC793].
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 7.1.  TCP User Interface
 
    The TCP user interface supports active and passive OPEN, SEND,
    RECEIVE, CLOSE, STATUS, and ABORT commands.  TCP-AO does not alter
    this interface as it applies to TCP, but some commands or command
    sequences of the interface need to be modified to support TCP-AO.
    TCP-AO does not specify the details of how this is achieved.
 
    TCP-AO requires that the TCP user interface be extended to allow the
    MKTs to be configured, as well as to allow an ongoing connection to
    manage which MKTs are active.  The MKTs need to be configured prior
    to connection establishment, and the set of MKTs may change during a
    connection:
 
    >> TCP OPEN, or the sequence of commands that configure a connection
    to be in the active or passive OPEN state, MUST be augmented so that
    an MKT can be configured.
 
    >> A TCP-AO implementation MUST allow the set of MKTs for ongoing TCP
    connections (i.e., not in the CLOSED state) to be modified.
 
    The MKTs associated with a connection need to be available for
    confirmation; this includes the ability to read the MKTs:
 
    >> TCP STATUS SHOULD be augmented to allow the MKTs of a current or
    pending connection to be read (for confirmation).
 
    Senders may need to be able to determine when the outgoing MKT
    changes (KeyID) or when a new preferred MKT (RNextKeyID) is
    indicated; these changes immediately affect all subsequent outgoing
    segments:
 
    >> TCP SEND, or a sequence of commands resulting in a SEND, MUST be
    augmented so that the preferred outgoing MKT (current_key) and/or the
    preferred incoming MKT (rnext_key) of a connection can be indicated.
 
    It may be useful to change the outgoing active MKT (current_key) even
    when no data is being sent, which can be achieved by sending a zero-
    length buffer or by using a non-send interface (e.g., socket options
    in Unix), depending on the implementation.
 
    It is also useful to indicate recent segment KeyID and RNextKeyID
    values received; although there could be a number of such values,
    they are not expected to change quickly, so any recent sample should
    be sufficient:
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    >> TCP RECEIVE, or the sequence of commands resulting in a RECEIVE,
    MUST be augmented so that the KeyID and RNextKeyID of a recently
    received segment is available to the user out of band (e.g., as an
    additional parameter to RECEIVE or via a STATUS call).
 
 7.2.  TCP States and Transitions
 
    TCP includes the states LISTEN, SYN-SENT, SYN-RECEIVED, ESTABLISHED,
    FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT, and
    CLOSED.
 
    >> An MKT MAY be associated with any TCP state.
 
 7.3.  TCP Segments
 
    TCP includes control (at least one of SYN, FIN, RST flags set) and
    data (none of SYN, FIN, or RST flags set) segments.  Note that some
    control segments can include data (e.g., SYN).
 
    >> All TCP segments MUST be checked against the set of MKTs for
    matching TCP connection identifiers.
 
    >> TCP segments whose TCP-AO does not validate MUST be silently
    discarded.
 
    >> A TCP-AO implementation MUST allow for configuration of the
    behavior of segments with TCP-AO but that do not match an MKT.  The
    initial default of this configuration SHOULD be to silently accept
    such connections.  If this is not the desired case, an MKT can be
    included to match such connections, or the connection can indicate
    that TCP-AO is required.  Alternately, the configuration can be
    changed to discard segments with the AO option not matching an MKT.
 
    >> Silent discard events SHOULD be signaled to the user as a warning,
    and silent accept events MAY be signaled to the user as a warning.
    Both warnings, if available, MUST be accessible via the STATUS
    interface.  Either signal MAY be asynchronous, but if so, they MUST
    be rate-limited.  Either signal MAY be logged; logging SHOULD allow
    rate-limiting as well.
 
    All TCP-AO processing occurs between the interface of TCP and IP; for
    incoming segments, this occurs after validation of the TCP checksum.
    For outgoing segments, this occurs before computation of the TCP
    checksum.
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    Note that use of TCP-AO on a connection is not negotiated within TCP.
    It is the responsibility of the receiver to determine when TCP-AO is
    required via other means (e.g., out of band, manually or with a key
    management protocol) and to enforce that requirement.
 
 7.4.  Sending TCP Segments
 
    The following procedure describes the modifications to TCP to support
    inserting TCP-AO when a segment departs.
 
    >> Note that TCP-AO MUST be the last TCP option processed on outgoing
    segments, because its MAC calculation may include the values of other
    TCP options.
 
    1. Find the per-connection parameters for the segment:
 
        a. If the segment is a SYN, then this is the first segment of a
           new connection.  Find the matching MKT for this segment based
           on the segment’s socket pair.
 
           i. If there is no matching MKT, omit TCP-AO.  Proceed with
              transmitting the segment.
 
          ii. If there is a matching MKT, then set the per-connection
              parameters as needed (see Section 4).  Proceed with the
              step 2.
 
        b. If the segment is not a SYN, then determine whether TCP-AO is
           being used for the connection and use the MKT as indicated by
           the current_key value from the per-connection parameters (see
           Section 4) and proceed with the step 2.
 
    2. Using the per-connection parameters:
 
        a. Augment the TCP header with TCP-AO, inserting the appropriate
           Length and KeyID based on the MKT indicated by current_key
           (using the current_key MKT’s SendID as the TCP-AO KeyID).
           Update the TCP header length accordingly.
 
        b. Determine SND.SNE as described in Section 6.2.
 
        c. Determine the appropriate traffic key, i.e., as pointed to by
           the current_key (as noted in Section 6.1, and as probably
           cached in the TCB).  That is, use the send_SYN_traffic_key for
           SYN segments and the send_other_traffic_key for other
           segments.
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        d. Determine the RNextKeyID as indicated by the rnext_key
           pointer, and insert it in the TCP-AO RNextKeyID field (using
           the rnext_key MKT’s RecvID as the TCP-AO KeyID) (as noted in
           Section 6.1).
 
        e. Compute the MAC using the MKT (and cached traffic key) and
           data from the segment as specified in Section 5.1.
 
        f. Insert the MAC in the TCP-AO MAC field.
 
        g. Proceed with transmitting the segment.
 
 7.5.  Receiving TCP Segments
 
    The following procedure describes the modifications to TCP to support
    TCP-AO when a segment arrives.
 
    >> Note that TCP-AO MUST be the first TCP option processed on
    incoming segments, because its MAC calculation may include the values
    of other TCP options that could change during TCP option processing.
    This also protects the behavior of all other TCP options from the
    impact of spoofed segments or modified header information.
 
    >> Note that TCP-AO checks MUST be performed for all incoming SYNs to
    avoid accepting SYNs lacking TCP-AO where required.  Other segments
    can cache whether TCP-AO is needed in the TCB.
 
    1. Find the per-connection parameters for the segment:
 
        a. If the segment is a SYN, then this is the first segment of a
           new connection.  Find the matching MKT for this segment, using
           the segment’s socket pair and its TCP-AO KeyID, matched
           against the MKT’s TCP connection identifier and the MKT’s
           RecvID.
 
           i. If there is no matching MKT, remove TCP-AO from the
              segment.  Proceed with further TCP handling of the segment.
 
              NOTE: this presumes that connections that do not match any
              MKT should be silently accepted, as noted in Section 7.3.
 
          ii. If there is a matching MKT, then set the per-connection
              parameters as needed (see Section 4).  Proceed with step 2.
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    2. Using the per-connection parameters:
 
        a. Check that the segment’s TCP-AO Length matches the length
           indicated by the MKT.
 
           i. If the lengths differ, silently discard the segment.  Log
              and/or signal the event as indicated in Section 7.3.
 
        b. Determine the segment’s RCV.SNE as described in Section 6.2.
 
        c. Determine the segment’s traffic key from the MKT as described
           in Section 5.1 (and as likely cached in the TCB).  That is,
           use the receive_SYN_traffic_key for SYN segments and the
           receive_other_traffic_key for other segments.
 
        d. Compute the segment’s MAC using the MKT (and its derived
           traffic key) and portions of the segment as indicated in
           Section 5.1.
 
           i. If the computed MAC differs from the TCP-AO MAC field
              value, silently discard the segment.  Log and/or signal the
              event as indicated in Section 7.3.
 
        e. Compare the received RNextKeyID value to the currently active
           outgoing KeyID value (current_key MKT’s SendID).
 
           i. If they match, no further action is required.
 
          ii. If they differ, determine whether the RNextKeyID MKT is
              ready.
 
              1. If the MKT corresponding to the segment’s socket pair
                 and RNextKeyID is not available, no action is required
                 (RNextKeyID of a received segment needs to match the
                 MKT’s SendID).
 
              2. If the matching MKT corresponding to the segment’s
                 socket pair and RNextKeyID is available:
 
                 a. Set current_key to the RNextKeyID MKT.
 
        f. Proceed with TCP processing of the segment.
 
    It is suggested that TCP-AO implementations validate a segment’s
    Length field before computing a MAC to reduce the overhead incurred
    by spoofed segments with invalid TCP-AO fields.
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    Additional reductions in MAC validation overhead can be supported in
    the MAC algorithms, e.g., by using a computation algorithm that
    prepends a fixed value to the computed portion and a corresponding
    validation algorithm that verifies the fixed value before investing
    in the computed portion.  Such optimizations would be contained in
    the MAC algorithm specification, and thus are not specified in TCP-AO
    explicitly.  Note that the KeyID cannot be used for connection
    validation per se, because it is not assumed random.
 
 7.6.  Impact on TCP Header Size
 
    TCP-AO, using the initially required 96-bit MACs, uses a total of 16
    bytes of TCP header space [RFC5926].  TCP-AO is thus 2 bytes smaller
    than the TCP MD5 option (18 bytes).
 
    Note that the TCP option space is most critical in SYN segments,
    because flags in those segments could potentially increase the option
    space area in other segments.  Because TCP ignores unknown segments,
    however, it is not possible to extend the option space of SYNs
    without breaking backward compatibility.
 
    TCP’s 4-bit data offset requires that the options end 60 bytes (15
    32-bit words) after the header begins, including the 20-byte header.
    This leaves 40 bytes for options, of which 15 are expected in current
    implementations (listed below), leaving at most 25 for other uses.
    TCP-AO consumes 16 bytes, leaving 9 bytes for additional SYN options
    (depending on implementation dependant alignment padding, which could
    consume another 2 bytes at most).
 
    o  SACK permitted (2 bytes) [RFC2018][RFC3517]
 
    o  Timestamps (10 bytes) [RFC1323]
 
    o  Window scale (3 bytes) [RFC1323]
 
    After a SYN, the following options are expected in current
    implementations of TCP:
 
    o  SACK (10bytes) [RFC2018][RFC3517] (18 bytes if D-SACK [RFC2883])
 
    o  Timestamps (10 bytes) [RFC1323]
 
    TCP-AO continues to consume 16 bytes in non-SYN segments, leaving a
    total of 24 bytes for other options, of which the timestamp consumes
    10.  This leaves 14 bytes, of which 10 are used for a single SACK
    block.  When two SACK blocks are used, such as to handle D-SACK, a
    smaller TCP-AO MAC would be required to make room for the additional
    SACK block (i.e., to leave 18 bytes for the D-SACK variant of the
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    SACK option) [RFC2883].  Note that D-SACK is not supportable in TCP
    MD5 in the presence of timestamps, because TCP MD5’s MAC length is
    fixed and too large to leave sufficient option space.
 
    Although TCP option space is limited, we believe TCP-AO is consistent
    with the desire to authenticate TCP at the connection level for
    similar uses as were intended by TCP MD5.
 
 7.7.  Connectionless Resets
 
    TCP-AO allows TCP resets (RSTs) to be exchanged provided both sides
    have established valid connection state.  After such state is
    established, if one side reboots, TCP-AO prevents TCP’s RST mechanism
    from clearing out old state on the side that did not reboot.  This
    happens because the rebooting side has lost its connection state, and
    thus its traffic keys.
 
    It is important that implementations are capable of detecting
    excesses of TCP connections in such a configuration and can clear
    them out if needed to protect its memory usage [Ba10].  To protect
    against such state from accumulating and not being cleared out, a
    number of recommendations are made:
 
    >> Connections using TCP-AO SHOULD also use TCP keepalives [RFC1122].
 
    The use of TCP keepalives ensures that connections whose keys are
    lost are terminated after a finite time; a similar effect can be
    achieved at the application layer, e.g., with BGP keepalives
    [RFC4271].  Either kind of keepalive helps ensure the TCP state is
    cleared out in such a case; the alternative, of allowing
    unauthenticated RSTs to be received, would allow one of the primary
    vulnerabilities that TCP-AO is intended to prevent.
 
    Keepalives ensure that connections are dropped across reboots, but
    this can have a detrimental effect on some protocols.  Specifically,
    BGP reacts poorly to such connection drops, even if caused by the use
    of BGP keepalives; "graceful restart" was introduced to address this
    effect [RFC4724], and extended to support BGP with MPLS [RFC4781].
    As a result:
 
    >> BGP connections SHOULD require support for graceful restart when
    using TCP-AO.
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    We recognize that support for graceful restart is not always
    feasible.  As a result:
 
    >> When BGP without graceful restart is used with TCP-AO, both sides
    of the connection SHOULD save traffic keys in storage that persists
    across reboots and restore them after a reboot, and SHOULD limit any
    performance impacts that result from this storage/restoration.
 
 7.8.  ICMP Handling
 
    TCP can be attacked both in band, using TCP segments, or out of band
    using ICMP.  ICMP packets cannot be protected using TCP-AO
    mechanisms; however, in this way, both TCP-AO and IPsec do not
    directly solve the need for protected ICMP signaling.  TCP-AO does
    make specific recommendations on how to handle certain ICMPs, beyond
    what IPsec requires, and these are made possible because TCP-AO
    operates inside the context of a TCP connection.
 
    IPsec makes recommendations regarding dropping ICMPs in certain
    contexts or requiring that they are endpoint authenticated in others
    [RFC4301].  There are other mechanisms proposed to reduce the impact
    of ICMP attacks by further validating ICMP contents and changing the
    effect of some messages based on TCP state, but these do not provide
    the level of authentication for ICMP that TCP-AO provides for TCP
    [Go10].  As a result, we recommend a conservative approach to
    accepting ICMP messages as summarized in [Go10]:
 
    >> A TCP-AO implementation MUST default to ignore incoming ICMPv4
    messages of Type 3 (destination unreachable), Codes 2-4 (protocol
    unreachable, port unreachable, and fragmentation needed -- ’hard
    errors’), and ICMPv6 Type 1 (destination unreachable), Code 1
    (administratively prohibited) and Code 4 (port unreachable) intended
    for connections in synchronized states (ESTABLISHED, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-
    WAIT-2, CLOSE-WAIT, CLOSING, LAST-ACK, TIME-WAIT) that match MKTs.
 
    >> A TCP-AO implementation SHOULD allow whether such ICMPs are
    ignored to be configured on a per-connection basis.
 
    >> A TCP-AO implementation SHOULD implement measures to protect ICMP
    "packet too big" messages, some examples of which are discussed in
    [Go10].
 
    >> An implementation SHOULD allow ignored ICMPs to be logged.
 
    This control affects only ICMPs that currently require ’hard errors’,
    which would abort the TCP connection [RFC1122].  This recommendation
    is intended to be similar to how IPsec would handle those messages,
    with an additional default assumed [RFC4301].
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 8.  Obsoleting TCP MD5 and Legacy Interactions
 
    TCP-AO obsoletes TCP MD5.  As we have noted earlier:
 
    >> TCP implementations that support TCP MD5 MUST support TCP-AO.
 
    Systems implementing TCP MD5 only are considered legacy, and ought to
    be upgraded when possible.  In order to support interoperation with
    such legacy systems until upgrades are available:
 
    >> TCP MD5 SHOULD be supported where interactions with legacy systems
    are needed.
 
    >> A system that supports both TCP-AO and TCP MD5 MUST use TCP-AO for
    connections unless not supported by its peer, at which point it MAY
    use TCP MD5 instead.
 
    >> A TCP implementation MUST NOT use both TCP-AO and TCP MD5 for a
    particular TCP connection, but MAY support TCP-AO and TCP MD5
    simultaneously for different connections (notably to support legacy
    use of TCP MD5).
 
    The Kind value explicitly indicates whether TCP-AO or TCP MD5 is used
    for a particular connection in TCP segments.
 
    It is possible that MKTs could be augmented to support TCP MD5,
    although use of MKTs is not described in RFC 2385.
 
    It is possible to require TCP-AO for a connection or TCP MD5, but it
    is not possible to require ’either’.  When an endpoint is configured
    to require TCP MD5 for a connection, it must be added to all outgoing
    segments and validated on all incoming segments [RFC2385].  TCP MD5’s
    requirements prohibit the speculative use of both options for a given
    connection, e.g., to be decided by the other end of the connection.
 
 9.  Interactions with Middleboxes
 
    TCP-AO may interact with middleboxes, depending on their behavior
    [RFC3234].  Some middleboxes either alter TCP options (such as TCP-
    AO) directly or alter the information TCP-AO includes in its MAC
    calculation.  TCP-AO may interfere with these devices, exactly where
    the device modifies information TCP-AO is designed to protect.
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 9.1.  Interactions with Non-NAT/NAPT Middleboxes
 
    TCP-AO supports middleboxes that do not change the IP addresses or
    ports of segments.  Such middleboxes may modify some TCP options, in
    which case TCP-AO would need to be configured to ignore all options
    in the MAC calculation on connections traversing that element.
 
    Note that ignoring TCP options may provide less protection, i.e., TCP
    options could be modified in transit, and such modifications could be
    used by an attacker.  Depending on the modifications, TCP could have
    compromised efficiency (e.g., timestamp changes), or could cease
    correct operation (e.g., window scale changes).  These
    vulnerabilities affect only the TCP connections for which TCP-AO is
    configured to ignore TCP options.
 
 9.2.  Interactions with NAT/NAPT Devices
 
    TCP-AO cannot interoperate natively across NAT/NAPT (Network Address
    Port Translation) devices, which modify the IP addresses and/or port
    numbers.  We anticipate that traversing such devices may require
    variants of existing NAT/NAPT traversal mechanisms, e.g.,
    encapsulation of the TCP-AO-protected segment in another transport
    segment (e.g., UDP), as is done in IPsec [RFC2663][RFC3947].  Such
    variants can be adapted for use with TCP-AO, or IPsec with NAT
    traversal can be used instead of TCP-AO in such cases [RFC3947].
 
    An alternate proposal for accommodating NATs extends TCP-AO
    independently of this specification [To10].
 
 10.  Evaluation of Requirements Satisfaction
 
    TCP-AO satisfies all the current requirements for a revision to TCP
    MD5, as summarized below [Ed07].
 
    1. Protected Elements
 
       A solution to revising TCP MD5 should protect (authenticate) the
       following elements.
 
       This is supported -- see Section 5.1.
 
       a. IP pseudoheader, including IPv4 and IPv6 versions.
 
          Note that optional coverage is not allowed because IP addresses
          define a connection.  If they can be coordinated across a
          NAT/NAPT, the sender can compute the MAC based on the received
          values; if not, a tunnel is required, as noted in Section 9.2.
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       b. TCP header.
 
          Note that optional port coverage is not allowed because ports
          define a connection.  If they can be coordinated across a
          NAT/NAPT, the sender can compute the MAC based on the received
          values; if not, a tunnel is required, as noted in Section 9.2.
 
       c. TCP options.
 
          Note that TCP-AO allows the exclusion of TCP options from
          coverage, to enable use with middleboxes that modify options
          (except when they modify TCP-AO itself).  See Section 9.
 
       d. TCP payload data.
 
    2. Option Structure Requirements
 
       A solution to revising TCP MD5 should use an option with the
       following structural requirements.
 
       This is supported -- see Section 5.1.
 
       a. Privacy.
 
          The option should not unnecessarily expose information about
          the TCP-AO mechanism.  The additional protection afforded by
          keeping this information private may be of little value, but
          also helps keep the option size small.
 
          TCP-AO exposes only the MKT IDs, MAC, and overall option length
          on the wire.  Note that short MACs could be obscured by using
          longer option lengths but specifying a short MAC length (this
          is equivalent to a different MAC algorithm, and is specified in
          the MKT).  See Section 2.2.
 
       b. Allow optional per connection.
 
          The option should not be required on every connection; it
          should be optional on a per-connection basis.
 
          This is supported because the set of MKTs can be installed to
          match some connections and not others.  Connections not
          matching any MKT do not require TCP-AO.  Further, incoming
          segments with TCP-AO are not discarded solely because they
          include the option, provided they do not match any MKT.
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       c. Require non-optional.
 
          The option should be able to be specified as required for a
          given connection.
 
          This is supported because the set of MKTs can be installed to
          match some connections and not others.  Connections matching
          any MKT require TCP-AO.
 
       d. Standard parsing.
 
          The option should be easily parseable, i.e., without
          conditional parsing, and follow the standard RFC 793 option
          format.
 
          This is supported -- see Section 2.2.
 
       e. Compatible with Large Windows and SACK.
 
          The option should be compatible with the use of the Large
          Windows and SACK options.
 
          This is supported -- see Section 7.6.  The size of the option
          is intended to allow use with Large Windows and SACK.  See also
          Section 1.3, which indicates that TCP-AO is 2 bytes shorter
          than TCP MD5 in the default case, assuming a 96-bit MAC.
 
    3. Cryptography requirements
 
       A solution to revising TCP MD5 should support modern cryptography
       capabilities.
 
       a. Baseline defaults.
 
          The option should have a default that is required in all
          implementations.
 
          TCP-AO uses a default required algorithm as specified in
          [RFC5926] and as noted in Section 5.1 of this document.
 
       b. Good algorithms.
 
          The option should use algorithms considered accepted by the
          security community, which are considered appropriately safe.
          The use of non-standard or unpublished algorithms should be
          avoided.
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          TCP-AO uses MACs as indicated in [RFC5926].  The KDF is also
          specified in [RFC5926].  The KDF input string follows the
          typical design (see [RFC5926]).
 
       c. Algorithm agility.
 
          The option should support algorithms other than the default, to
          allow agility over time.
 
          TCP-AO allows any desired algorithm, subject to TCP option
          space limitations, as noted in Section 2.2.  The use of a set
          of MKTs allows separate connections to use different
          algorithms, both for the MAC and the KDF.
 
       d. Order-independent processing.
 
          The option should be processed independently of the proper
          order, i.e., they should allow processing of TCP segments in
          the order received, without requiring reordering.  This avoids
          the need for reordering prior to processing, and avoids the
          impact of misordered segments on the option.
 
          This is supported -- see Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5.  Note that
          pre-TCP processing is further required, because TCP segments
          cannot be discarded solely based on a combination of connection
          state and out-of-window checks; many such segments, although
          discarded, cause a host to respond with a replay of the last
          valid ACK, e.g., [RFC793].  See also the derivation of the SNE,
          which is reconstituted at the receiver using a demonstration
          algorithm that avoids the need for reordering (in Section 6.2).
 
       e. Security parameter changes require key changes.
 
          The option should require that the MKT change whenever the
          security parameters change.  This avoids the need for
          coordinating option state during a connection, which is typical
          for TCP options.  This also helps allow "bump in the stack"
          implementations that are not integrated with endpoint TCP
          implementations.
 
          Parameters change only when a new MKT is used.  See Section 3.
 
    4. Keying requirements.
 
       A solution to revising TCP MD5 should support manual keying, and
       should support the use of an external automated key management
       system (e.g., a protocol or other mechanism).
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       Note that TCP-AO does not specify an MKT management system.
 
       a. Intraconnection rekeying.
 
          The option should support rekeying during a connection, to
          avoid the impact of long-duration connections.
 
          This is supported by the use of IDs and multiple MKTs; see
          Section 3.
 
       b. Efficient rekeying.
 
          The option should support rekeying during a connection without
          the need to expend undue computational resources.  In
          particular, the options should avoid the need to try multiple
          keys on a given segment.
 
          This is supported by the use of the KeyID.  See Section 6.1.
 
       c. Automated and manual keying.
 
          The option should support both automated and manual keying.
 
          The use of MKTs allows external automated and manual keying.
          See Section 3.  This capability is enhanced by the generation
          of unique per-connection keys, which enables use of manual MKTs
          with automatically generated traffic keys as noted in Section
          5.2.
 
       d. Key management agnostic.
 
          The option should not assume or require a particular key
          management solution.
 
          This is supported by use of a set of MKTs.  See Section 3.
 
    5. Expected Constraints
 
       A solution to revising TCP MD5 should also abide by typical safe
       security practices.
 
       a. Silent failure.
 
          Receipt of segments failing authentication must result in no
          visible external action and must not modify internal state, and
          those events should be logged.
 
          This is supported - see Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5.
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       b. At most one such option per segment.
 
          Only one authentication option can be permitted per segment.
 
          This is supported by the protocol requirements - see Section
          2.2.
 
       c. Outgoing all or none.
 
          Segments out of a TCP connection are either all authenticated
          or all not authenticated.
 
          This is supported - see Section 7.4.
 
       d. Incoming all checked.
 
          Segments into a TCP connection are always checked to determine
          whether their authentication should be present and valid.
 
          This is supported - see Section 7.5.
 
       e. Non-interaction with TCP MD5.
 
          The use of this option for a given connection should not
          preclude the use of TCP MD5, e.g., for legacy use, for other
          connections.
 
          This is supported - see Section 8.
 
       f. "Hard" ICMP discard.
 
          The option should allow certain ICMPs to be discarded, notably
          Type 3 (destination unreachable), Codes 2-4 (transport protocol
          unreachable, port unreachable, or fragmentation needed and IP
          DF field set), i.e., the ones indicating the failure of the
          endpoint to communicate.
 
          This is supported - see Section 7.8.
 
       g. Maintain TCP connection semantics, in which the socket pair
          alone defines a TCP association and all its security
          parameters.
 
          This is supported - see Sections 3 and 9.
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 11.  Security Considerations
 
    Use of TCP-AO, like the use of TCP MD5 or IPsec, will impact host
    performance.  Connections that are known to use TCP-AO can be
    attacked by transmitting segments with invalid MACs.  Attackers would
    need to know only the TCP connection ID and TCP-AO Length value to
    substantially impact the host’s processing capacity.  This is similar
    to the susceptibility of IPsec to on-path attacks, where the IP
    addresses and SPI would be visible.  For IPsec, the entire SPI space
    (32 bits) is arbitrary, whereas for routing protocols typically only
    the source port (16 bits) is arbitrary (typically with less than 16
    bits of randomness [La10]).  As a result, it would be easier for an
    off-path attacker to spoof a TCP-AO segment that could cause receiver
    validation effort.  However, we note that between Internet routers,
    both ports could be arbitrary (i.e., determined a priori out of
    band), which would constitute roughly the same off-path antispoofing
    protection of an arbitrary SPI.
 
    TCP-AO, like TCP MD5, may inhibit connectionless resets.  Such resets
    typically occur after peer crashes, either in response to new
    connection attempts or when data is sent on stale connections; in
    either case, the recovering endpoint may lack the connection key
    required (e.g., if lost during the crash).  This may result in
    timeouts, rather than a more responsive recovery after such a crash.
    Recommendations for mitigating this effect are discussed in Section
    7.7.
 
    TCP-AO does not include a fast decline capability, e.g., where a SYN-
    ACK is received without an expected TCP-AO and the connection is
    quickly reset or aborted.  Normal TCP operation will retry and
    timeout, which is what should be expected when the intended receiver
    is not capable of the TCP variant required anyway.  Backoff is not
    optimized because it would present an opportunity for attackers on
    the wire to abort authenticated connection attempts by sending
    spoofed SYN-ACKs without TCP-AO.
 
    TCP-AO is intended to provide similar protections to IPsec, but is
    not intended to replace the use of IPsec or IKE either for more
    robust security or more sophisticated security management.  TCP-AO is
    intended to protect the TCP protocol itself from attacks that TLS,
    sBGP/soBGP, and other data stream protection mechanisms cannot.  Like
    IPsec, TCP-AO does not address the overall issue of ICMP attacks on
    TCP, but does limit the impact of ICMPs, as noted in Section 7.8.
 
    TCP-AO includes the TCP connection ID (the socket pair) in the MAC
    calculation.  This prevents different concurrent connections using
    the same MKT (for whatever reason) from potentially enabling a
    traffic-crossing attack, in which segments to one socket pair are
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    diverted to attack a different socket pair.  When multiple
    connections use the same MKT, it would be useful to know that
    segments intended for one ID could not be (maliciously or otherwise)
    modified in transit and end up being authenticated for the other ID.
    That requirement would place an additional burden of uniqueness on
    MKTs within endsystems, and potentially across endsystems.  Although
    the resulting attack is low probability, the protection afforded by
    including the received ID warrants its inclusion in the MAC, and does
    not unduly increase the MAC calculation or MKT management.
 
    The use of any security algorithm can present an opportunity for a
    CPU Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, where the attacker sends false,
    random segments that the receiver under attack expends substantial
    CPU effort to reject.  In IPsec, such attacks are reduced by the use
    of a large Security Parameter Index (SPI) and Sequence Number fields
    to partly validate segments before CPU cycles are invested validated
    the Integrity Check Value (ICV).  In TCP-AO, the socket pair performs
    most of the function of IPsec’s SPI, and IPsec’s Sequence Number,
    used to avoid replay attacks, isn’t needed due to TCP’s Sequence
    Number, which is used to reorder received segments (provided the
    sequence number doesn’t wrap around, which is why TCP-AO adds the SNE
    in Section 6.2).  TCP already protects itself from replays of
    authentic segment data as well as authentic explicit TCP control
    (e.g., SYN, FIN, ACK bits) but even authentic replays could affect
    TCP congestion control [Sa99].  TCP-AO does not protect TCP
    congestion control from this last form of attack due to the
    cumbersome nature of layering a windowed security sequence number
    within TCP in addition to TCP’s own sequence number; when such
    protection is desired, users are encouraged to apply IPsec instead.
 
    Further, it is not useful to validate TCP’s Sequence Number before
    performing a TCP-AO authentication calculation, because out-of-window
    segments can still cause valid TCP protocol actions (e.g., ACK
    retransmission) [RFC793].  It is similarly not useful to add a
    separate Sequence Number field to TCP-AO, because doing so could
    cause a change in TCP’s behavior even when segments are valid.
 
 12.  IANA Considerations
 
    The TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO) was assigned TCP option 29 by
    IANA action.
 
    This document defines no new namespaces.
 
    To specify MAC and KDF algorithms, TCP-AO refers to a separate
    document [RFC5926].
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